Whom or what exactly do our Trident nuclear submarines deter?
This
was the question I posed earlier on Twitter, swiftly generating a few responses.
Answers
included ‘MOD spending cuts’, ‘fish mostly’, and one from my most hawkish
friend which read ‘At the moment, nothing. In the future, possibly the Iranians,
Chinese, North Koreans, French, Germans’ - I think he pines for the days when
you only needed to have a shufti across the Channel if you fancied a bit of swash
and buckle.
The logic
of maintaining a nuclear deterrent during the Cold War, while much debated, was at least clear. Indeed,
it can be argued that the threat of Mutually Assured Destruction, acknowledged
by all sides, prevented leaders from going that fateful extra step in one of
the many moments of high tension. But,
these days it is hard to identify a single country vaguely deterred by our
nuclear arsenal whatsoever.
Defence
secretary Philip Hammond was pretty clear on the Today programme that now is
not the time to downgrade our nuclear options. He
said:
‘We have had for 45 years now a continuous-at-sea deterrent posture which
has served this country very well and we do not believe that with nuclear
threats, if anything, proliferating, with more countries seeking to get nuclear
weapons, this is the time to downgrade, certainly not to go to a part-time
deterrent.’
But
this argument simply isn’t coherent. In his very comments, Hammond exposes the intellectual dishonesty of the deterrent claim. Despite our ‘continuous-at-sea’
posture, no country has been deterred from seeking a nuclear weapon.
Proliferation has, as the minister acknowledges, continued. If anything our retention
of nuclear weapons has simply spurred others on to join the club.
After
all, does Iran, pressing on with its nuclear programme, look over its shoulder nervously, worried if a British submarine
might rise in the Strait of Hormuz? Seems unlikely. North Korea appeared perfectly happy to indulge in a bit of silly sabre rattling, making all sorts of wild
claims about its military capabilities, regardless of Britain’s nuclear
weapons. But the government remains committed to spending billions – some claim
up to £100billion over 30 years – on a new generation of weapons just in case.
And
then there is the question of whether a Prime Minister, or defence minister
would actually press the button if such terrible circumstances arose.
A few
years ago Denis Healey, who served as defence secretary under Harold Wilson,
was asked this very question. If Britain had been attacked and Wilson had been
killed, Healey would have been the minister to go to the Royal Air Force’s
Bomber Command bunker and trusted with the decision as to whether to retaliate.
This is what Lord Healey said:
‘I did
feel rather worried about it because I knew it would be a very difficult
decision to take. I realised I would find it very, very difficult indeed to
agree to use a nuclear weapon – and I think most people would.’
Further pressed, Healey
was asked what if the head of Bomber Command told him Russian nuclear weapons
were already raining down on targets across the country. He replied: ‘I think I
would still have said that that, I’m afraid, is no reason doing something like
that. Because most of the people you kill would be innocent civilians.’
Lord
Healey is hardly a shrinking violet and any minister today would face an even
trickier decision. For Healey was talking about days when an enemy could be
clearly identified; that is no longer the case. Yes, rogue states can be counted simply enough but one of one of the biggest nuclear threats facing the UK comes from
rogue individuals and terrorist organisations who have no country allegiance.
It would, for example, be inconceivable to launch a nuclear retaliation on
Pakistan if Al Qaeda terrorists from there successfully detonated a device in
London.
Of
course what this is really about is prestige. Both major political parties know
that in order to maintain any international authority retaining nuclear armed
submarines is necessary. Whether Britain needs to play such a major role on the
international stage is another debate entirely. But it would be good if those pushing
to spend such vast sums of money on military toys would at least be honest
about their motives.
